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COMPETING VALUES:
PRESERVING LITIGANT AUTONOMY IN
AN AGE OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS
Linda S. Mullenix*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt concerning Judge Jack Weinstein’s monumental
impact on the law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  In a
career spanning decades, Judge Weinstein has played a major activist
role in shaping legal debates and jurisprudence concerning criminal
law, evidence, civil procedure, the role of the judge, and more
broadly, questions of access to justice.1  Judge Weinstein’s accomplish-
ments are rightly honored by the academy and the legal profession,
and his remarkable longevity has permitted other occasions to memo-
rialize his enormous contributions to justice in America.2
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1. See generally JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND
ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN (2011).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Tribute to the Honorable Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1947
(1997); Symposium, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Tort Litigation, and the Public Good, 12 J.L. &
POL’Y 149 (2003) (a round table discussion honoring Judge Weinstein); Joan B. Wexler, In Praise
of Jack B. Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1968 (1997).
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The sheer scope of Judge Jack Weinstein’s interests, expertise, and
professional accomplishments—including thousands of judicial opin-
ions often running into hundreds of pages—presents an unnerving
task for anyone venturing an appreciation of Judge Weinstein’s life’s
work.  Surely this was a problem that Professor Jeffrey Morris grasped
when he undertook the daunting task of writing his excellent judicial
biography of Judge Weinstein.3  That book, based on hundreds of
hours of interviews and extensive research of Judge Weinstein’s work
product, provides an estimable examination of the reach of Judge
Weinstein’s influence on the law.
It is senseless to attempt to evaluate in which spheres of justice
Judge Weinstein’s life’s work has had the greatest impact; surely each
attempt to evaluate includes an individual assessment of Judge Wein-
stein’s enduring influence on the law.  This paper focuses on Judge
Weinstein’s significant contributions to the development and resolu-
tion of mass tort litigation—a legal arena in which he is so closely
identified as to have earned the title of the King of Mass Torts.4
Without a doubt, Judge Weinstein emerged as an early and leading
proponent of collective redress for claimants allegedly injured by mass
tort harms.  As will be discussed, Judge Weinstein’s innovative ap-
proach to resolving mass tort cases was forged in the 1960s during the
heyday of class action litigation, with the concomitant recognition of
an emerging model of public law litigation.  Firmly grounded in this
ethos, Judge Weinstein quickly grasped the problem of mass tort liti-
gation as a modern form of 1960s-style public law litigation. So con-
strued, Judge Weinstein spent over four decades of his career creating
novel procedures to accomplish collective redress for injured
claimants.
Against this backdrop of Judge Weinstein’s role as a significant ex-
positor of mass tort litigation, this Article explores the debate be-
tween litigant autonomy and collective redress that undergirded the
early days of mass tort litigation.  As will be seen, this vital debate
gradually receded as proponents of aggregate settlements—including
Judge Weinstein—dominated the field.  Clearly, collective redress ad-
vocates prevailed in this jurisprudential debate, supported in large
measure (but not exclusively) by the influence of Judge Weinstein’s
jurisprudence.  However, as innovative means for resolving mass torts
and aggregate litigation emerged in the twenty-first century, including
3. MORRIS, supra note 1.
4. Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appel-
late Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 560 (2002).
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various informal and nonclass aggregation techniques, a number of
scholars have revitalized the debate centered on litigant autonomy.5
Thus, it is perhaps ironic that the federal judge so closely associated
with the need for a compassionate interaction between the judicial
officer and the individual brought before a court would choose, in civil
litigation at least, the path of collective redress over litigant auton-
omy.  Moreover, it is perhaps ironic that the judge so singularly sensi-
tive to individual needs would embrace jurisprudence that effectively
reduces individuals to faces in the crowd.  Furthermore, it is perhaps
confounding that the judge so alert to fundamental questions of jus-
tice and fairness would ultimately embrace the judicial rationale of
efficiency above all else—a rationale now shared, surprisingly, with
Judge Richard Posner.6
While recent debates over collective redress versus litigant auton-
omy have polarized along familiar lines,7 others scholars have sought
to find a middle ground for rethinking the problem of litigant auton-
omy in an age of aggregate settlements.8  After reviewing these schol-
arly efforts, this article turns to a brief discussion of developments in
the European Union (EU), where, after many years of resisting
American-style class litigation, EU countries are now considering a
recommendation from the European Commission (EC) to implement
collective redress mechanisms.9
Prior to joining the movement for collective redress, the EU coun-
tries engaged in a heated debate concerning the civil law fundamental
“adversary” principle, a concept that embraces the notion of litigant
autonomy.  Unlike the United States, the EU has resolved this debate
by insisting that any collective redress mechanism must simultane-
ously provide for the preservation of litigant autonomy.
In conclusion, the EU debate and its ultimate resolution provide an
interesting, provocative opportunity for revitalization of the litigant
autonomy debate in the United States.  In the United States, parties
to massive disputes have radically transformed the ways in which ag-
gregate claims are resolved, so that these claims no longer resemble
5. See infra notes 132–162 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013) (defending an
earlier finding of an efficiency rationale in support of Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action certifi-
cation); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Rule
23(b)(3) requirement for predominance of common questions “is a question of efficiency,” dis-
cussing the efficiency rationale undergirding Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions, and upholding
class certification in the moldy washing machine litigation).
7. See infra notes 132–156 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 157–162 and accompanying text.
9. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60.
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class litigation of the late twentieth century.  These new modalities for
aggregate claim resolution should raise concerns about fundamental
fairness and justice to individual claimants, because the mechanisms
have significantly limited or eliminated opportunities for meaningful
litigant involvement in the resolution of individual claims.  Thinking
about ways to permit aggregate claims resolution while preserving and
enhancing litigant autonomy—which autonomy has been largely sacri-
ficed as a consequence of the triumph of aggregate claims processing
during the late twentieth century—is a worthy project.
II. THE 1960S PARADIGM SHIFT TO PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND
JUDGE WEINSTEIN’S EMBRACE OF COLLECTIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A. The Shift from Traditional Bipolar Litigation to
Public Law Litigation
If biography is destiny, then there is much in Judge Weinstein’s per-
sonal narrative to illuminate his judicial philosophy.  Judge Weinstein
comes by his passion for justice honestly, raised in the midst of the
vibrant immigrant communities of New York City and as a child of the
Great Depression.10  His formative years were tempered by the dire
economic circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the exper-
iences of World War II’s Greatest Generation.11  As a witness to this
cauldron of human experience, Judge Weinstein developed an abiding
compassion for the poor, illiterate, destitute, unfortunate, sick, and
wounded: the least favored among us.12
Although Judge Weinstein’s sympathies were nurtured throughout
these formative years, he actually is a true child of the social and polit-
ical ferment of the liberal 1960s.  In the judicial arena, these heady
days were characterized chiefly by the Warren Court’s imprint, with
its historical recognition and expansion of civil rights and liberties.13
In the procedural arena, landmark advances in access to justice were
accomplished through the enactment of President Lyndon Johnson’s
Great Society progressive legislative program,14 coupled with histori-
10. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 30–36.
11. Id. at 36–41.
12. Id. at 35 (“Weinstein has never lost his emotional connection to the working class commu-
nity within which he grew up and those with whom he had worked in his high school and college
years.  He remembers that these were the people that really needed an advocate.”).
13. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1998); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); THE WAR-
REN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
14. See generally ROBERT DALLEK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT
190–207 (2004).
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cal rule revisions that enabled private enforcement of newly created
rights. Thus, the decade from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s
was characterized by an unusual convergence of comprehensive fed-
eral substantive legislation and significant federal procedural reforms.
In this period, President Lyndon Johnson was able to effectively work
with Congress to enact a sweeping domestic legislative agenda, includ-
ing the Civil Rights Acts of 196415 and 1968,16 the Voting Rights Acts
of 196517 and 1970,18 the Higher Education Act,19 Medicare,20 and
other similar legislation.21
In tandem with these substantive legislative initiatives, Congress en-
acted a “rules package” (1966 Amendments) that substantially
amended several procedural rules.22 The procedural rules included,
most notably, Rule 18,23 dealing with joinder of claims and remedies;
Rule 19,24 dealing with necessary and indispensable parties and
renamed “Joinder of Persons Needed for a Just Adjudication”; Rule
20,25 dealing with permissive joinder of parties; Rule 23,26 the class
action rule; and Rule 24,27 dealing with intervention.
An overarching philosophy united the historic 1966 Amendments.
By the early 1960s, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules concluded
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).  Titles I and VIII add voting rights provisions. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 101,
801, 78 Stat. at 241–42, 266.  Titles III and IV provide for school and public facility desegrega-
tion.  § 301, § 401, 78 Stat. at 246–49.  Title IX authorizes federal intervention in claims of denials
of equal protection.  § 901, 78 Stat. at 266–67.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The 1968 Civil Rights Act includes provisions dealing with civil
rights violence, such as civil disobedience and rioting.  Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. at 73–77.  Title
VIII provides for a comprehensive fair housing law.  § 801, 82 Stat. at 81–89.  Other provisions
(Titles II-VII) are related to Native American rights.  §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. at 77–81.
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
18. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
19. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (providing for Medicare and Medicaid).
20. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
21. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
22. See generally Sherman Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204
(1966) (commenting on the 1966 Amendments); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356
(1967) (notes from the Advisory Committee Reporter on the 1966 Amendments).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (“Joinder of Claims”).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (“Required Joinder of Parties”).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (“Permissive Joinder of Parties”).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (“Class Actions”).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (“Intervention”).
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that several federal rules, most notably the joinder rules, failed to ef-
fectuate the intentions of the 1938 drafters of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.28  Rather than facilitating the liberal joinder of parties and
claims, the rules had instead calcified into a set of rigid, inflexible, and
limiting principles that defeated the original rule makers’ intentions.
Hence, the 1966 Amendments were intended to rectify the inflexibil-
ity that had accreted to the joinder provisions.  The Advisory Commit-
tee Notes described the problems with the original rules and indicated
the intended liberal application for the amendments.29  Significantly
(and famously), the reform of Rule 23 was the centerpiece initiative of
the 1966 Amendments.
Many commentators have noted the impact of the 1966 class action
rule reform, explaining how that liberal rule revision empowered new
classes of litigants, created a new plaintiffs’ class action bar, and in-
spired an outpouring of class action litigation,30 characterizing the
decade following the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 as a Golden Age of
class action litigation.  In this ten-year span, plaintiffs’ attorneys uti-
lized the amended class action rule to accomplish various social justice
initiatives aimed at reforming the practices of institutions resistant to
change.  Thus, the period between the mid-1960s and 1970s exper-
ienced significant class action litigation for injunctive and declaratory
relief, pursued through the Rule 23(b)(2) class action.  The paradigm
litigation of this era, then, sought reform of prison systems, school in-
tegration, housing and accommodations, and relief from conditions of
incarceration as well as mental health facilities.31
Surveying these vital new legal initiatives, Professor Abram Chayes
of Harvard Law School famously detected a major paradigm shift in
the legal landscape, which he described in his 1976 landmark article
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.32  The central thesis of
Professor Chayes’s article was to contrast the “traditional” civil law-
suit with the new litigation model that emerged mid-century in federal
courts.  Professor Chayes identified five salient characteristics of the
28. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2013) (describing the failure of the original class
action rule).
29. KAPLAN, supra note 22.
30. Id. at 609–11.
31. See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. School Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (ordering a integration plan for the Mark Twain middle school in Coney
Island, Brooklyn); Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1977) (order granting a
prisoner access to telephones) United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (hold-
ing that a prisoner had a right to receive meals meeting religious dietary requirements).
32. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
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traditional civil case: (1) the lawsuit was bipolar; (2) the litigation was
retrospective; (3) the right and the remedy were interdependent; (4)
the lawsuit was a self-contained episode; and (5) the process was
party-initiated and party-controlled.33
Professor Chayes described a new “public law” model of adjudica-
tion as “sprawling and amorphous,” “subject to change over the
course of the litigation,” and “suffused and intermixed with negotiat-
ing and mediating processes at every point” with the judge as a domi-
nant figure in organizing and guiding the case, as well as continuing
involvement in administration and implementation of relief.34  He
then identified the types of litigation embraced by this new public law
model:
School desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners’ or
inmates’ rights cases come readily to mind as avatars of this new
form of litigation.  But it would be mistaken to suppose that it is
confined to these areas.  Antitrust, securities fraud and other as-
pects of the conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorga-
nizations, union governance, consumer fraud, housing
discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental manage-
ment—cases in all these fields display in varying degrees the fea-
tures of public law litigation.35
As others have noted, Professor Chayes’s description was dated at
the time he published his observations.36  In 1976, Professor Chayes’s
analysis reflected dramatic changes in the litigation landscape of the
1950s and 1960s: an era marked at the outset by the Supreme Court’s
1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.37  Professor Chayes’s
vision, then, was cabined by a backward-looking but nonetheless accu-
rate reflection of events in the 1950s and 1960s.
Nonetheless, the wholesale revision of the joinder rules ushered in
and encouraged a new age of complex litigation that essentially was
nonexistent in federal practice prior to the 1966 Amendments; class
actions were not a major portion of federal dockets and the original
class action rule was difficult to construe and apply.38  The flexibility
and liberal ethos of the 1966 Amendments invited complexity, encour-
33. Id. at 1282–83.
34. Id. at 1284.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 647, 648 (1988) (“Perhaps more basically, Chayes’s focus on public law litigation
seems ill-conceived because the incidence of the kind of lawsuits he had in mind—school deseg-
regation and prison conditions cases—was waning even as he wrote.”).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Marcus, supra note 28, at 600–01 (discussing the difficulties with applying the original
class action rule).
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aging the expansion of civil litigation.  Indeed, the amended interven-
tion rule invited persons outside the litigation to join. In short, the
1966 Amendments made possible modern federal complex litigation
as we know it.
In the same spirit that inspired the 1966 Amendments, Congress in
1968 enacted the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute,39
which liberally provided for the transfer of cases within the federal
system to one venue for coordinated pretrial proceedings.40  The
MDL statute, then, also made possible modern federal complex litiga-
tion. In this same period, the federal courts expanded standing doc-
trines to liberally permit access to the federal courts—yet another
factor that contributed to the burgeoning complex litigation in the
1960s and 1970s.41
It is no surprise, then, that the mid-1960s ushered in a decade of
bustling class action and other complex litigation activity.  This dec-
ade—on which Professor Chayes reflected—was chiefly the decade of
the great Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class action.  Attorneys quickly
learned to harness the Rule 23(b)(2) class action to seek remediation
under the civil rights laws and related legislation.  Hence, the publica-
tion of Professor Chayes’s classic article in 1976—exactly one decade
after the 1966 Amendments—aptly captured the synergistic interac-
tion of the new federal substantive law and the liberalized federal pro-
cedure.  As Professor Chayes observed, this combination of events
resulted in a paradigm shift to a new type of litigation—his public law
model.
B. Judge Weinstein’s Transformative Role as Judicial Advocate for
the Public Law Litigation Model
Professor Chayes’s description of the public law model was in-
sightful, capturing the essence of the paradigm shift in litigation that
had occurred in the prior decade.  In hindsight, however, Professor
Chayes’s model captured a brief historical moment; he did not antici-
pate modern dispersed mass tort litigation or foresee the other types
of complex litigation that have emerged in federal forums in the
twenty-first century.
39. Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012)).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (according liberal standing to
sue to environmental protection nonprofit groups).
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Nonetheless, other actors in the complex litigation arena seized
upon Professor Chayes’s insights about the public law model as a use-
ful analogy to advocate on behalf of the efficacy of various new com-
plex litigation techniques.  Thus, Professor David Rosenberg of
Harvard Law School42 and Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York became leading proponents of this view.43
It is not surprising that Professor Chayes’s insights concerning the
public law paradigm resonated so strongly with Judge Weinstein.
Early in his judicial career, Judge Weinstein became a devotee of the
class action as a means to resolve group claims, albeit in conventional
1960s-style class litigation.44  But Judge Weinstein’s appreciation for
the class action rule was significantly amplified during his manage-
ment of the Agent Orange litigation,45 which was Judge Weinstein’s
gateway to the mass tort universe and his domination of the field.   In
the context of his developing expertise with mass tort cases, Judge
Weinstein readily embraced the analogy to public law litigation, draw-
ing the comparison to the 1960s institutional reform litigation with
which he was very familiar. Judge Weinstein explained:
Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving court-or-
dered restructuring of institutions to protect constitutional rights.
In dealing with such mass tort cases as Agent Orange, asbestos, and
42. See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); see also David Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Tort
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); David
Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisis or Chrysalis? A Comment on Feinberg’s Conceptual
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 183 (1987).
43. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995); see also PETER
H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 268–76 (1986)
(describing the public law tort approach endorsed by Professor Rosenberg and Judge Wein-
stein); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
472–74 (1994).
44. See, e.g., Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the state institution violated mentally handicapped children’s con-
stitutional rights, and ordering corrective measures), vacated, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that a prisoner had a right
to receive meals meeting religious dietary requirements); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (ordering an integration plan for the
Mark Twain middle school in Brooklyn, New York); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting a preliminary injunction that permitted segregated Muslim pretrial
detainees to participate in religious activities with general inmate population); Manicone v.
Cleary, No. 74 C 575 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1977) (order granting a prisoner access to telephones).
After thirty-four years, Judge Weinstein’s school desegregation order in Hart was finally lifted
after a judicial finding that the school had achieved racial diversity and was receiving high scores
on state examinations.  Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 536 F. Supp. 2d 274, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
45. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 43 (describing at length Judge Weinstein’s management
and supervision of the Agent Orange litigation and class action settlement).
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DES, I have sensed an atmosphere similar to that of public interest
cases I have supervised, such as the Mark Twain school desegrega-
tion case, the reform of the Suffolk County Developmentally Dis-
abled Center, and jail and prison reform litigation.46
Thus, for Judge Weinstein, both mass tort and public law litigations
implicated serious political and sociological issues.  Both were con-
strained by economic imperatives.  Both had strong psychological un-
derpinnings.  And both affected larger communities than those
encompassed by the litigants before the court.  Applying the public
law model to the mass tort context, Judge Weinstein concluded:
Mass tort cases unfortunately do not involve the application of
legislative schemes representing careful analysis of the policy
problems presented.  By their very nature, these cases involve unan-
ticipated problems with wide-ranging social and political ramifica-
tions.  A judge does not “legislate from the bench” simply because
he or she considers the broadest implications of his or her decisions
in such a case.  Judges not only may take such a view; they must.47
Thus, Judge Weinstein easily extrapolated from his 1960s experience
of institutional reform litigation48 to the 1970s and 1980s phenomenon
of mass tort litigation.  Not only did he view these cases as analogous
to the sprawling, amorphous public law cases of the 1960s, but the
public law model also supplied Judge Weinstein with the rationale and
justification for the managerial judging he endorses:
[J]udges, particularly in mass tort cases, cannot and should not re-
main neutral and passive in the face of problems implicating the
public interest.  In mass tort cases, the judge often cannot rely on
the litigants to frame the issues appropriately.  The judge cannot
focus narrowly on the facts before the court, declining to take into
account the relationship of those facts to the social realities beyond
the courthouse door. The judge cannot depend upon the slow creep
of case-by-case adjudication to yield just results and just rules of
law.
In this respect the problem is analogous to that of institutional
reform litigation.49
It is perhaps worth noting that nearly forty years later, neither Pro-
fessor Chayes’s nor Judge Weinstein’s public law paradigms accurately
capture the current terrain of complex aggregate claim resolution.50
In the twenty-first century, aggregate dispute settlements have
46. Weinstein, supra note 43, at 472–74 (footnotes omitted).
47. Weinstein, supra note 43, at 541 (footnotes omitted).
48. See MORRIS, supra note 1, at 168–74.
49. Weinstein, supra note 43, at 540.
50. See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 579 (1994) (rejecting the analogy to 1960s public law litigation as misplaced);
see also Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Dispute
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stretched the boundaries of the judicial function, arrogating to private
parties as well as an array of judicial surrogates vast powers for resolv-
ing aggregate claims.  This aggregative private dispute resolution para-
digm resembles nothing so much as private legislation with wide-
reaching effects, carrying the pseudo-imprimatur of judicial oversight
and approval, but frequently accompanied by troubling questions
about fairness, adequate representation, and the merger of legislative,
administrative, and judicial functions.
III. ORIGINS OF THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE OF THE
1980S–1990S: THE TRIUMPH OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS
A. The Debate Between Litigant Autonomy and Aggregate
Claim Resolution
The jurisprudential debate between litigant autonomy and aggre-
gate claim resolution developed somewhat slowly after, and as a con-
sequence of, the advent of the seminal mass tort cases on federal
dockets.  The beginnings of the era of mass tort litigation can be
traced to the late 1970s, when courts first experienced an influx of
significant numbers of individual tort claims based on exposure to
toxic substances (asbestos), injuries from defective medical devices
(the Dalkon Shield), or harms caused by pharmaceuticals (Bendectin
and diethylstilbestrol (DES)).51  Perhaps the most emblematic, semi-
nal mass tort litigation of that era was Agent Orange, which eventually
came under Judge Weinstein’s judicial management.52  As Professor
Peter Schuck aptly noted in his 1986 book, the Agent Orange litigation
represented “a new kind of case.”53  In the Agent Orange litigation,
Schuck recognized that the courts were confronted “with an unprece-
dented challenge to our legal system,” of which the legal system had
not yet grasped.54
Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999) (discussing changes in the litigation land-
scape from the 1960s class action paradigm).
51. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 4–20 (2d ed.
2008) (describing seminal mass torts in asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and Agent Orange litigation);
see also Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69,
70–74 (noting that mass trials of personal injury claims were largely unknown before the 1970s,
and tracing modern group litigation in the United States to the early 1970s).
52. Judge George C. Pratt originally was assigned the Agent Orange litigation and issued nu-
merous orders prior to Judge Weinstein’s assuming authority over the litigation. See, e.g., In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (order denying motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
53. SCHUCK, supra note 43, at 3.
54. Id. at 6.
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Significantly, the fact that Professor Schuck did not venture these
opinions until 1986 highlights the point that courts, scholars, and prac-
titioners were relatively slow to grasp the significance of the new mass
tort cases emerging on state and federal dockets.  The best evidence of
the profession’s gradual awakening to the new, challenging litigation
was the creation by institutional organizations, in the mid-1980s, of
numerous task forces and research efforts to “study” the problem of
mass tort litigation and provide recommendations for handling these
new complex cases.55
1. Litigant Autonomy: The Scholarly Debate in the 1980s
While institutional law reform organizations began undertaking va-
rious projects to study mass tort litigation, federal judges grappled
with judicial case management and the problem of whether mass torts
could be certified under the class action rule.56  When some courts
55. There was a flurry of such efforts from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. See, e.g.,
A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) (studying
mass tort phenomenon and recommending changes to the MDL statute and a federalized choice-
of-law regime); 2 A.L.I., REPORTERS’ STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 389–91 (1991) (defining the problem of mass tort litigation); FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) (part of the 1988 Judicial
Improvements Act; containing three recommendations relating to complex litigation); MARK A.
PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES at vii, 31–37 (1988);
Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litigation, Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee
on Asbestos Litigation (Mar. 1991) (recommending that Congress consider a national legislative
scheme for resolution of asbestos personal injury claims or new statutory authority for consolida-
tion and collective trials of asbestos cases; also recommending that Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules study amendments to Rule 23 to accommodate requirements of mass tort cases); Comm’n
on Mass Torts, A.B.A., Report Number 126 to the A.B.A. House of Delegates (Aug. 1989)
(studying mass tort litigation and making recommendations concerning handling of litigation
arising out of single event disasters or negligent product design). .
In addition to these institutional studies, other legislative bodies were actively involved in
proposing legislation to address the emerging problems relating to mass tort litigation. See, e.g.,
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1993, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) (1993
version of a succession of acts to deal with mass tort cases, intended to amend Title 28 to add a
new section on multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction and to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to permit trial
of transferred actions). A watered down version of this legislation, conferring diversity jurisdic-
tion over civil actions arising from single accidents, was subsequently enacted in 2002. Mul-
tiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012). Compare id. with
UNIFORM TRANSFER OF LITIGATION ACT (1991) (establishing a model code for transferring and
consolidating cases in state courts).  See generally Deborah H. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (noting the burgeoning interest in
mass tort litigation and institutional law reform efforts underway in the mid-1980s).
56. See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982) (reversing class certification), cert. denied sub nom. A. H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); In re “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Schreir v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.), mandamus
granted, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (vacating trial court’s Bendectin class certification);
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forged ahead with certification of mass tort or settlement classes (with
mixed success),57 commentators began questioning whether the effi-
ciency rationales supporting class certification subverted fundamental
rights to litigant autonomy.  Thus, by the mid-1980s, the actions of
various judges in turning to Rule 23 as the superior means for resolv-
ing mass tort litigation inspired the first round of the litigant auton-
omy debate.
As this nascent debate developed, there was no clear or authorita-
tive articulation of the concept of litigant autonomy.58  Instead, propo-
nents defaulted to formulaic rhetoric which generally embraced a
litigant’s right to have her “day in court.”59  As will be seen, the con-
cept of litigant autonomy has been explained variously to include pro-
cess rights to supervise or manage one’s own litigation;60 to engage in
a meaningful relationship with an attorney of the litigant’s choosing;61
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUB-
STANCES LITIGATION 211–21 (1996) (noting that the mandatory certification of class action set-
tlement of Bendectin claims was overturned on appeal to Sixth Circuit); MORTON MINTZ, AT
ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 240–45 (1985) (describing
A.H. Robins’ attempts to certify a punitive damage class of Dalkon Shield claimants, which was
defeated in the Ninth Circuit in 1982 and denied by Judge Robert Mehrige in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia in 1985).
57. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding class certifi-
cation of school districts seeking compensation for costs of asbestos remediation); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding class certification of asbestos
claimants); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating class certification of
victims of the Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalk collapse under the Anti-Injunction Act); In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting class certification
in the Agent Orange litigation); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated,
100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (vacating class certification of DES claimants); Yandle v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denying class certification to the proposed asbestos
litigation class).
58. See Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2007) (noting the surprising
lack of attention to the collectivist–individual tension that adheres in the class action
framework).
59. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson
Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Sergio J.
Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2012) (noting the Supreme
Court’s invocation of the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
in court”); Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1573 (anchoring the Court’s litigant autonomy
understanding to a due process view preserving an individual’s right to have their day in court).
60. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1579 (“‘Autonomy,’ in contrast, refers to the indi-
vidual’s interest in having the power to make choices about the protection of her own legally
authorized or protected rights through resort to the litigation process.”).
61. SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263–64 (noting that a primary attribute of the traditional non-
aggregative approach to litigation involved “the sanctity and indissolubility of the conventional
attorney–client relationship”); see also Hensler, supra note 55, at 91 (noting that a primary attri-
bute of the traditional nonaggregative approach to litigation involved “the sanctity and indissol-
ubility of the conventional attorney–client relationship”).
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to have an opportunity to develop the litigation and evidence related
to the litigation;62 and to appear and give testimony before a jury.63
Expressions of litigant autonomy also encompassed personal dignity
principles, including the psychological or cathartic values entailed in
exercising individual autonomy.64   In addition, the concept of litigant
autonomy often has been defined in opposition to its alternative of
collective dispute resolution, aggregative nature of which undermines
or eliminates essential attributes of litigant autonomy.65
The nascent jurisprudential debate that pitted the relative merits of
aggregate litigation against litigant autonomy was advanced chiefly in
the scholarly arena, but also found expression in judicial opinions.  In
this period, Professor Roger Trangsrud offered perhaps the most co-
gent articulation of the importance of litigant autonomy in the emerg-
ing age of aggregate litigation.66  He argued that the traditional
justifications for individual claim autonomy remained important in
mass tort cases, and he anchored this claim in due process rights.  Cen-
tral to his argument was the notion that tort claims in particular, be-
cause of the personal nature of bodily injury, typically involved
incidents of tremendous importance to the individual plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s family.67  He suggested that until recently, the American le-
gal system had treated such claims “with uncompromised due
process.”68
Professor Trangsrud also discussed the various process values im-
portant to the concept of litigant autonomy, particularly in personal
injury tort cases.  Among these were the ability to procure an attorney
of one’s own choosing, to develop a relationship with that attorney, to
assist in case development,69 and perhaps most importantly, to appear
62. SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263.
But the traditional view is also deeply embedded in American legal traditions and indi-
vidualistic liberal values that sanctify certain doctrines and institutions—the fault stan-
dard, private control of litigation, trial by jury, the dominance of “reasonableness”
criteria, the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule for proof of causation, and a relatively
passive judicial role in tort cases.
Id.
63. SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263–64.
64. Id. at 263 (noting the dignitary interests involved in personal injury torts).
65. Id. at 262–63; see also Hensler, supra note 55, at 90.
66. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 74–76.
67. Id. at 74; see also SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263 (noting that tort claims involve an “inva-
sion of dignitary and other subjective interests, particularly pain and suffering”).
68. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 74.
69. Id. at 74–76; see also SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263.
A class action corrodes the individual attorney–client relationship. The intimate contact
and consultation that force lawyers to educate their clients, respond to their wishes, and
litigate faithfully and vigorously are supplanted by a condition of amorphous anonym-
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in court to give testimon—to tell one’s story to a jury of peers.70  In
this regard, Professor Transgrud was mindful of sociological studies
supporting the cathartic effects of witness testimony.  Moreover, limit-
ing the ownership and control over the prosecution of a tort claim to
the injured party was essential to avoid the possible risk of overreach-
ing, deception, and misconduct by others seeking to bring the tort
claim on another’s behalf.71
Furthermore, Professor Trangsrud recognized that while courts had
expanded their scope to provide remedial social justice through the
class action vehicle (noting the public law litigation of the 1960s), he
urged that these examples should not be used to obscure “the original
and first purpose of our civil courts—to adjudicate justly disputes be-
tween individuals.”72  In support of the judicial system’s “jealous pro-
tection” of an individual’s absolute right to control his or her own tort
claim, Professor Trangsrud noted that English and American courts
had long held that personal injury claims were not assignable to
others.73  Additionally, the American legal system had traditionally
operated from the assumption that economic decisions are best made
by the true property owner (or in this case, the tort claimant), rather
than by another person.74  Thus, control and disposition of a claim
ought to rest with the claimant (the injured party or his family), and
ity. Meaningful communication, trust, and accountability become impossible. In effect,
individual litigants lose their personal attorneys. They must settle instead for represen-
tation by court-designated lead counsel, whose loyalties are diffuse and whose incen-
tives may be different.
SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 263.
70. Id. at 263–64.
71. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 75. Professor Trangsrud argued:
Unless control of such tort claims was left to the injured party, a “litigious person could
harass and annoy others if allowed to purchase claims for pain and suffering and pursue
the claims in court as assignees.”  There was also the risk of overreaching, deception,
and other misconduct by the party seeking to acquire the right to bring a tort claim on
another’s behalf.  These remain major concerns today, as evidenced by the methods
used by attorneys to solicit clients in mass tort cases and to obtain control over the
cases of nonclients by bringing class actions or becoming lead counsel in huge consoli-
dated tort cases.  The attorney’s fees at stake in mass tort cases are so high as to strain
the norms that ought to govern professional conduct.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 264 (noting the potential for compro-
mise of the attorneys’ autonomy and duties of loyalty in class action negotiations and
settlements).
72. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 74.
73. Id. at 75.
74. Id.; see also SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 264 (noting that the position of tort claimants may
differ significantly with regard to the value of their individual claims, and therefore the inequities
of subjecting individuals to uniform class treatment was correspondingly increased).
616 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:601
not with some stranger such as a class representative or the lead coun-
sel in a class action case consolidated in some venue.75
While suggesting that the concept of litigant autonomy was
grounded in American due process principles, Professor Trangsrud ul-
timately based the litigant autonomy principle on more profound nat-
ural law sources:
Underlying our tradition of individual claim autonomy in sub-
stantial tort cases is the natural law notion that this is an important
personal right of the individual.  While much less celebrated than
other natural rights, such as the right to practice one’s own religion
or to think and speak freely, the right to control personally the suit
whereby a badly injured person seeks redress from the alleged
tortfeasor has long been valued both here and in England. The re-
sponsibility for asserting such a claim rested with the injured indi-
vidual and his family, and the exercise of this right was protected. It
was not the duty of the government or some third party to initiate
such suit, nor could the government or some third party interfere
with in the prosecution of the action.76.
Two observations are in order. First, Professor Trangsrud’s anchor-
ing the litigant autonomy principle in natural law theory was some-
what surprising in the age of positive law, because natural law theory
finds scant expression in our constituent documents or legislation, es-
pecially as it relates to tort claims.  Nonetheless, Professor Martin
Redish has recently revitalized the concept of litigant autonomy as a
measure of both due process and freedom of expression,77 a conten-
tion that resonates in Professor Trangsrud’s original natural law argu-
ment.  Second, as we shall see, the European insistence on litigant
autonomy—their deeply held adversary principle—derives from natu-
ral law theory.
In this same period, advocates for the growing consensus in support
of aggregate claim resolution responded to Professor Trangsrud’s dis-
sent from mass tort litigation trials.  These advocates challenged Pro-
fessor Trangsrud’s argument on its own grounds: namely, that his
75. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 75.  Professor Trangsrud also noted that individual claimants
often wish to litigate or settle based on an array of economic considerations, intangible personal
beliefs, or concerns which are unique to them, individually.  If claimants enjoy autonomy over
their claims, then they can obtain an outcome best suited to their personal views. In contrast,
[i]f others assume control over their claim, then this is less likely to happen because
these strangers will often not be aware of the special circumstances attending this claim
or will have a divided loyalty because the stranger will often be responsible for many
other substantial tort claims as well.
Id. at 75–76; see also SCHUCK, supra note45, at 263–64 (discussing the distorted role of counsel in
class litigation).
76. Trangsrud, supra note 51, at 74–75.
77. Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1575.
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depiction of the virtues of individual claim prosecution—his vision of
litigant autonomy—were highly idealized, unrealistic, and not sup-
ported by the ways in which traditional tort litigation was accom-
plished in the real world.78
In debunking Professor Trangsrud’s vision of the sanctity of litigant
claim autonomy, Professor Deborah Hensler used empirical research
findings on ordinary tort litigation from Rand Corporation to con-
clude that, in practice, such litigation diverged substantially from Pro-
fessor Trangsrud’s vision.  Thus, the version of legal reality drawn
from empirical research suggested instead a litigation process in which
(1) lawyer–client relations are more often perfunctory and superfi-
cial than intimate; (2) the locus of control is shifted toward lawyers
rather than clients; (3) lawyers educate their clients to a view of the
legal process that serves the lawyer’s interests as much, if not more
than clients’ interests; (4) litigants are frequently only names to both
lawyers and court personnel; and (5) trial is rarely desired, except
perhaps by litigants, or delivered.79
With the chief arguments in support of the litigant autonomy princi-
ple thus deflated, Professor Hensler used the Rand Corporation’s
findings to articulate what would become several core tenets of the
aggregationist position: (1) a crisis mentality generated by the sheer
numbers of tort cases filed on court dockets; (2) the futility of at-
tempting to resolve these cases on an individualized basis; and (3) the
lack of enthusiasm by lawyers and judges for adjudicating these cases
on an individualized basis.80  She concluded: “In mass tort cases, the
sheer volume of litigation exacerbates the tensions between the sys-
tem’s goals and the actors’ financial and other incentives that are pre-
sent even in routine cases. Personalized case-by-case processing is not
possible and not desired by many lawyers and judges.”81
78. Hensler, supra note 55, at 91–97.
79. Id. at 92.
80. Id. at 96–98.
81. Id. at 104. Ironically, Professor Hensler suggested (one may only venture hopefully) that
mass aggregate litigation might be configured to address both the demands of judicial efficiency
as well as litigant autonomy:
Faced with the realities of current mass tort litigation, courts—and legal scholars—
should be open to the possibility that expanding the use of formal aggregative proce-
dures may provide more litigant control over the litigation process, more opportunity
for litigant participation in the process, and a better match between victims’ losses and
compensation for these losses.
Id. In this suggestion, Professor Hensler anticipated the conclusion and recommendations of the
EU countries by several decades. For a discussion of the EU Recommendation on Collective
Redress Mechanisms, see infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text.
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2. Litigant Autonomy: The Courts Weigh In
The scholarly debate over litigant autonomy versus aggregate litiga-
tion that emerged in the mid-1980s was engendered by the academic
community’s reaction to experiments by activist judges in shaping new
and often innovative techniques for resolving mass torts.82  By the
mid-1980s, several judges with significant mass tort dockets forged
ahead with using the class action to attempt to resolve these cases.83
Although most of the judicial opinions evaluating the merits of class
certification hewed closely to the Rule 23 requirements,84 any number
of the new mass tort judges infused their decisions with dicta explain-
ing various policy rationales for the approval of class resolution of
mass torts.  Thus, the arguments in favor of aggregation found a voice
in judicial opinions of this era.85
By the mid-1980s, the theory and policy rationales supporting class
action resolution of mass tort cases were grounded largely in effi-
ciency and pragmatism.  In opinions certifying mass tort classes, the
judges sounded several common themes about adjudicating these new
mega-cases.  Often, judges invoked a crisis mentality generated by the
sheer number of cases on their dockets.86  In addition, judges noted
the similarity and repetitive nature of the claims, concluding that re-
peated individualized trial of duplicative cases was wasteful, costly,
82. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 55, at 90.
83. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding
Judge Weinstein’s class certification and approval of the Agent Orange class action settlement);
Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding class certification of
an asbestos litigation class); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding
class certification of a nationwide class of school districts seeking compensation for the remedia-
tion of asbestos hazards in school buildings).
84. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 83.
85. See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 470–71. Perhaps the most famous expression of the judiciary’s
embrace of mass tort class litigation was the Fifth Circuit’s pronouncement in Jenkins: “Neces-
sity moves us to change and invent.” Id. at 473.
86. See, e.g., id. at 470, 473 (noting that 21 million American workers were potentially exposed
to significant amounts of asbestos, translating into thousands of law suits, and that courts were
“ill-equipped” to handle this “avalanche of litigation”) (“The courts are now being forced to
rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume of litigation and more frequent
mass disasters.”); School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1000 (characterizing the asbestos litigation
scene as an “unparalleled situation in American tort law”); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D.
382, 390 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (certifying a class of DES
claimants) (“Mass marketing of potent drugs is a modern phenomenon. Traditional models of
litigation, pitting one plaintiff against one defendant, were not designed to, and cannot, deal with
the potential injury to numerous and geographically dispersed persons that mass marketing
presents.”).
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and inefficient.87  This efficiency rationale, in turn, supported the
quest for a more effective means of resolving mass claims on an aggre-
gate basis.88  Addressing fairness concerns, judges turned the auton-
omy principle on its head, urging that the sheer volume of cases would
deny individual litigants their day in court—that justice delayed was
justice denied.89
Other courts rationalized experiments with novel class action tech-
niques by reference to the judicial management tool of conditional
certification.90  Hence, even those judges skeptical of aggregate tech-
niques for resolving mass torts permitted leeway to such experimenta-
tion, reasoning that if the litigation subsequently proved
unmanageable, the court could always decertify the class.91  Finally,
some mass tort judges noted (some in exasperation, apparently) that
the courts needed to act to resolve mass tort litigation in an aggrega-
tive fashion because Congress declined to legislate solutions to these
burgeoning mass tort problems.92  Judicial activism to address mass
tort litigation, then, in the face of the failure of legislative action, was
87. See, e.g., MULLENIX, supra note 51, at 40 (reprinting a December 29, 1989 order from
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc. noting that the court did not have the resources to try 3,031
asbestos minitrials, coupled with the astronomical costs of trying those cases).
88. See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472 (stating that the purpose of class actions was to conserve
resources of parties and courts by permitting claims to be litigated in an economical fashion); In
re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 784–86 (E.D.N.Y 1980) (approving class
certification of Agent Orange claimants after considering other procedural alternatives); Payton,
83 F.R.D. at 390 (“[C]ourts are faced with the choice of adapting traditional methods to the
recurrent phenomenon of widespread drug litigation or leaving large numbers of people without
a practical means of redress. It has been the tradition of the common law to adapt.”).
89. See, e.g., MULLENIX, supra note 51, at 40 (reprinting a December 29, 1989 order from
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., noting that individual asbestos cases had been pending for
over three years, and concluding that “[t]his Court can see no justice in denying the Plaintiffs
their day in court in the interest of providing the Defendants with a procedure for the repetitive
assertion of their defenses”).
90. See, e.g., School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1011; Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 790 (indi-
cating that the court could subsequently decertify the Agent Orange class if individualized issues
of causation or damages became problematic). The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 eliminated the
provision in Rule 23(c) permitting conditional class certification, which often was relied upon by
mass tort judges in certifying these class actions.
91. See, e.g., School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1011; Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 790.
92. See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 241 B.R. 48, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (commenting on the
failure of Congress to enact comprehensive national mass tort legislation); In re Joint E. and S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 878, 906 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting Congress’s
repeated failure to enact national tort legislation even if restricted only to mass torts); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445,
1454 (D. Colo. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Continental Airlines Corp.,
964 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1992) (urging Congress to enact uniform tort law to apply in mass tort
cases).
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viewed as a principle of necessity to achieve justice for injured
claimants.93
While some judges forged ahead with various class action experi-
ments, other courts instead resisted the nascent aggregationist move-
ment, at least through the mid-1980s.  These courts declined to
endorse arguments based on pragmatic efficiency rationales, but
rather hewed closely to Rule 23 requirements which mass tort cases
typically failed to satisfy.94  Other courts, focused on problems of ap-
plicable law, viewed attempts to certify nationwide mass tort cases as
violative of Erie principles.95  As a practical matter, some judges,
when confronted with novel class certification motions or proposed
trial plans suggested that they could perceive no benefits to be gained
from class certification.96  Furthermore, when confronted with novel,
multiphase trial plans for adjudicating the rights of mass tort claim-
ants, some courts rejected these proposals, concluding that the innova-
tive plans did not resemble trials as contemplated by the Seventh
Amendment or the tradition of jury trials in the United States.97  And,
responding to justifications based on legislative inaction, other courts
predictably responded that such judicial activism exceeded the judici-
ary’s authority by engaging in a de facto legislative function.98  Per-
haps most interesting, however, is that very few of the courts
93. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Do Mass Torts Belong in the Courtroom?, 74 JUDICATURE 237
(1991) (stating that in the absence of Congressional action, courts must grapple with problems
raised by mass torts).
94. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (vacating class
certification because of the misapplication of Rule 23(b) class categories); In re N. Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850–51 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying class certi-
fication for failure of the proponents to satisfy Rule 23(a) requirements); Yandle v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 570–71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denying class certification for failure of the pro-
posed class action to satisfy predominance and superiority requirements).
95. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying
a nationwide class of hemophiliacs without proper regard to Erie doctrine on applicable law in
federal diversity cases); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740–44 (5th Cir. 1986) (decer-
tifying the class when the trial court failed to take into account varying applicable state law).
96. See, e.g., Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.N.H. 1983) (declining to certify a
class of DES claimants, concluding that “[t]he advantage of certifying a class in this action is at
best obscure, and the gain difficult to perceive”).
97. See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (disapproving a three-
phase trial plan of asbestos claimants) (“We are persuaded on reflection that the procedures
here called for comprise something other than a trial within our authority. It is called a trial, but
it is not.”).
98. Id. (“It is sufficient now to conclude that Phase II [of the trial plan] cannot go forward
without changing Texas law and usurping legislative prerogatives, a step federal courts lack the
authority to take.”).
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eschewing mass tort class litigation referenced the litigant autonomy
principle in their opinions.99
For nearly a decade spanning the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s,
the tension between collective redress mechanisms and litigant auton-
omy percolated throughout the mass tort litigation landscape.  How-
ever, in a series of landmark 1986 appellate decisions, the
aggregationists effectively prevailed in the jurisprudential debate.  In
that year, the Fifth Circuit upheld the first asbestos class action,100 the
Third Circuit endorsed a nationwide class of school districts seeking
compensation for asbestos abatement,101 and the Second Circuit up-
held class certification of the Agent Orange settlement.102  Collec-
tively, these three appellate decisions embraced the litany of
rationales for expanded application of Rule 23 to mass tort litigation
and ushered in a decade of further experimentation with novel aggre-
gation techniques.103  The proponents on behalf of the litigant auton-
omy principle had lost the day, and the litigant autonomy argument
receded from the public debate over mass tort and class action
litigation.
B. Judge Weinstein’s Conflicted Views on Litigant Autonomy and
Collective Redress
It would do a grave injustice to Judge Weinstein to suggest that he is
not interested in individual justice; his entire career and judicial phi-
losophy stands as a rebuke to such a suggestion.  Judge Weinstein is
rightly known and honored precisely for his concerns over ensuring
individual dignity to each person appearing before a court, especially
but not exclusively in the criminal context.104  Judge Weinstein has
correctly apprehended the intimidating, coercive nature of judicial
proceedings and documented his efforts to provide assistance, succor,
99. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1573 (“Surprisingly little of this wealth of discus-
sion, however, has concerned the collectivist–individual tension that inheres in much of the class
action framework.”); see also id. at 1584–85 (“It is both puzzling and distressing, then, that noth-
ing in the Court’s controlling due process jurisprudence even touches on, much less values, the
interest in litigant autonomy.”). It is difficult to find any judicial opinions referencing litigant
autonomy, other than passing references to a tradition of honoring a litigant’s right to his day in
court. Certainly, courts eschewing class certification of mass tort cases did not rest their decisions
on litigant autonomy grounds.
100. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
102. In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
103. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding class certifi-
cation of victims of Marcos regime, and settling damage claims by a statistical extrapolation
methodology); Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving statistical mod-
eling for class-wide damages).
104. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 97, 101, 137–41, 182–84, 209–12, 251–63.
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and reassurance to the less fortunate caught up in the legal system.105
He famously has been a crusader for reform of the harsh mandates of
the sentencing guidelines, precisely because those guidelines provide
judges with scant leeway to modify criminal sentences to take into
account highly individualized circumstances.106  Indeed, even in the
mass tort arena, he titled his seminal and influential work Individual
Justice in Mass Tort Litigation.107
And yet one cannot doubt that in the class action and mass tort
arena, Judge Weinstein has been the foremost aggregationist of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  No other judge has had a greater
impact than Judge Weinstein, who throughout his career has been the
primary judicial innovator to endorse experimental aggregate litiga-
tion techniques.  Beginning in the late 1970s with his initial forays into
civil rights and public law class litigation,108  Judge Weinstein readily
approved of the class action rule as a means to achieve social jus-
tice.109  And when handed the Agent Orange litigation in the early
1980s, Judge Weinstein engrafted his knowledge of the public law
model onto resolving the Agent Orange cases.  He never looked back.
Furthermore, when the federal courts in the mid-to-late 1990s began
to repudiate novel class experiments, Judge Weinstein pivoted to em-
brace nonclass action settlement techniques to resolve aggregate liti-
gation, single-handedly inventing the quasi-class action.110
Judge Weinstein’s opinions in mass tort and class action decisions—
entailing lengthy factual and procedural exposition—invariably de-
fault to the various rationales developed by aggregationist courts and
105. Id. at 61–64, 239–41.
106. Id. at 63–64, 101, 140–41, 279.
107. WEINSTEIN, supra note 43.
108. See supra notes 44–49.
109. See supra notes 44–49.
110. See McMillan v. City of New York, 2008 WL 4287573, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2010)
(stating, in an attorney fee dispute, that “in a sense this was a quasi[-]aggregate or quasi[-]class
action with increased power to control fees”); see also McMillan v. City of New York, 2010 WL
1487738, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2010) (noting in an attorney fee dispute from the Staten
Island Ferry crash litigation that “[t]he benefits of that aspect of this quasi-class action litigation
allegedly accrued to hundreds of injured claimants, including the client[s]”); In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233
F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 162, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (third-party payor litigation against tobacco company defen-
dant) (“Defendants have not raised the point that, in a sense the class action or quasi-class action
such as the present one, where many claims are aggregated, takes care of the problem of social
payment for the full cost of damages a defendant caused.”); United States v. Cheung, 952 F.
Supp. 148, 148–49 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (federal restitution action for criminal actions) (“What was in
effect a civil quasi-class action is coordinated with a criminal proceeding to assure maximum
recovery by the victims with minimum transactional costs.”); cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious
Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CINN. L. REV. 389 (2011).
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scholars.111  Thus, Judge Weinstein squarely aligned with the scholars
and jurists who concluded that in the mass tort arena, the sheer vol-
ume of cases ensured that justice delayed meant justice denied.
IV. REVIVING THE LITIGANT AUTONOMY DEBATE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. The Search for a Middle Path: Reconciling Aggregate Claim
Resolution with Litigant Autonomy
While this Article contends that by the mid-1990s the aggregation-
ists had won the field in favor of collective redress mechanisms, others
may rightly point to the eventual federal judicial backlash against in-
novative use of Rule 23 to refute this assertion.  Thus, Judge Posner’s
famous repudiation of nationwide class certification of the tainted
blood cases in 1995,112 followed quickly by the Fifth Circuit’s reversal
of the nationwide certification of a class of persons addicted to nico-
tine products,113 signaled a rethinking of the suitability of the class
action rule to resolve mass tort cases.114  Moreover, the Supreme
Court finally entered the mass tort arena in the late 1990s, driving
significant nails into the aggregationist position by repudiating two na-
tionwide class action settlements of asbestos claims.115
In its Amchem and Ortiz decisions especially, the Court (in exten-
sive dicta) telegraphed its distaste for the innovative experiments fed-
eral judges had been using to resolve mass tort cases through the class
action rule.116  Focusing on the dictates of the Rules Enabling Act,117
the Court indicated that the actions of federal judges in certifying
mass tort litigation and settlement classes most likely had transcended
judicial authority under the Rules Enabling Act.118  Concurring Jus-
111. See generally MORRIS, supra note 1, at 315–68 (analyzing Judge Weinstein’s path-break-
ing judicial activism and innovation in mass tort litigation spanning four decades).
112. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
113. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
114. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a class of penile
implant claimants).
115. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997).
116. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845 (“Finally, if we needed further counsel against adventurous appli-
cation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the Rules Enabling Act and the general doctrine of constitutional
avoidance would jointly sound a warning of serious constitutional concerns that come with any
attempt to aggregate individual tort claims on a limited fund rationale.”); see also Amchem, 521
U.S. at 628–29.
117. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2072 (2012).
118. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864 (“The Advisory Committee did not envision mandatory class ac-
tions in cases like this one, and both the Rules Enabling Act and the policy of avoiding serious
constitutional issues counsel against leniency in recognizing mandatory limited fund actions in
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tices noted that the courts were not free “to devise an ideal system for
adjudicating” mass tort claims, and that unless and until the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules revised the class action rule, the appropri-
ate resolution of mass tort cases “cries out for legislative solution.”119
Most notably, perhaps, the Court’s 1999 opinion in Ortiz—repudi-
ating a mandatory limited fund class settlement of nationwide asbes-
tos claims—revitalized the litigant autonomy debate that had receded
during the heyday of the aggregationist movement.  The Court noted
that “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and the day-
in-court ideal [was] only magnified” if individual claims were aggre-
gated into a mandatory settlement class.120  The Court suggested that
serious due process concerns were raised when claimants might be
unidentifiable, or when claims were resolved without regard to con-
sent or, in some instances, contrary to the objections of dissenters.121
Invoking the litigant autonomy principle, the Court concluded:
[N]o less important, mandatory class actions aggregating damage
claims implicate the due process “principle of general application in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party
or to which he has not been made party by service of process” it
being “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court.’”122
While it might seem that, at the close of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the litigant autonomy principle ef-
fectively ended grand experiments with collective redress mecha-
nisms, nothing could be further from reality.  The federal judicial
decisions limiting application of the class action rule did not kill off
class litigation; rather, these decisions famously channeled class litiga-
tion into state court forums,123 eventually precipitating enactment of
circumstances markedly different from the traditional paradigm.”); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at
629.
119. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting the “elephantine mass of
asbestos cases”).
120. Id. at 846 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 846–47.
122. Id. at 846 (citations omitted) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940), and
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989)).
123. See generally The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3; The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. REP. NO. 108-123 (2003)
(detailing the channeling of class litigation into state courts in the wake of federal resistance to
certifying litigation and settlement classes in the late 1990s); 151 CONG. REC. H727-29 (daily ed.
Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005124 to address alleged
abusive state court class action practices.125
Moreover, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, federal judicial
restraint in application of the class action rule induced the plaintiff
and defense bars to seek and fashion new aggregate litigation mecha-
nisms to resolve collective claims apart from the constraints of the
class action rule.  Thus, the litigation landscape changed radically,
with a focus on utilizing the MDL statute and MDL forums as a
means for resolving massive litigation through nonclass aggregate set-
tlements.126  The most prominent exemplars of this trend were the
pharmaceutical Vioxx settlement,127 followed by Judge Weinstein’s
similar oversight of the Zyprexa settlement.128
In addition, the very language of complex dispute resolution shifted
from exclusive discussion of class actions and instead focused on the
more amorphous concept of “aggregate litigation,”129 a label that em-
braced an array of nonclass collective redress mechanisms.  This shift
124. Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
125. See, e.g., Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class mem-
bers with legitimate claims; [to] restore the intent of the framers . . . by providing for
Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction; and [to] benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer
prices.” As this description makes clear, CAFA was designed primarily to curb per-
ceived abuses of the class action device which, in the view of CAFA’s proponents, had
often been used to litigate multi-state or even national class actions in state courts.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. at 5); see
also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that CAFA
expanded federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction to combat perceived abuses in class litiga-
tion and abusive practices by the plaintiffs’ class counsel); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 2012
WL 3704935, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 25, 2012) (same); Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., 2008 WL 4401367,
at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008) (same).
126. Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics
Doctrine To Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 59, 64, 71, 85, 87–95 (2013) (describing the changed litigation landscape from class ac-
tions to MDL auspices, with reference to attorney fee awards). Professor Ratner asks:
How do we account for both the similarities and the differences between class actions
and MDLs, in terms of the degree of litigant autonomy and involvement? For example,
trial courts do not typically pass judgment on the fairness or adequacy of non-class
aggregate settlements; but given the extraordinary degree of disenfranchisement of in-
dividual plaintiffs within the aggregate of an MDL, should they?
Id. at 85.
127. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010) (describing Vioxx
nonclass litigation and settlement in an opinion relating to fee awards); see also In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009) (same).
128. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing
Zyprexa litigation and settlement in nonclass context in an opinion relating to fee awards).
129. See, e.g, A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010).
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in terminology was purposeful; it permitted advocates frustrated by
judicial constraints in the class action arena to embrace more expan-
sive collective redress mechanisms that effectively circumvented the
class action rule.  In keeping with the changing litigation landscape,
Judge Weinstein readily embraced these new aggregative techniques,
agreeing that the federal decisions limiting the use of the class action
rule required resort to new innovative techniques for resolving mass
claims.130
Although it may seem that the litigant autonomy debate receded
from jurisprudential attention in the wake of the Court’s decision in
Ortiz,131 in the last decade, several scholars have revitalized this de-
bate, often (but not exclusively) in the shadow of nonclass collective
redress mechanisms.132  Perhaps the most prominent proponent of the
litigant autonomy principle is Professor Martin Redish, whose argu-
ments favoring litigant autonomy are based on his belief of the an-
tidemocratic nature of class action litigation.133
The recent resuscitation of the litigant autonomy debate is signifi-
cant for three reasons.  First, scholars have attempted to offer more
conceptually comprehensive definitions of the litigant autonomy prin-
ciple than had been ventured in earlier conversations.134  Second,
scholars have aligned along a more nuanced spectrum of views regard-
130. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Pre-
liminary Draft No. 4 of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation); see also Linda S. Mullenix,
Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511,
547–49 (2013) (discussing Judge Weinstein’s endorsement of nonclass aggregate settlement tech-
niques in light of the difficulty of obtaining and prosecuting class litigation).
131. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see also Redish & Larsen, supra note 58,
at 1584–85 (“Surprisingly little of this wealth of discussion, however, has concerned the collectiv-
ist–individual tension that inheres in much of the class action framework.”).
132. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Auton-
omy in Non-Class Collective Representation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525–26 (2003).  Professor
Erichson contends, correctly, that the arguments favoring class action litigation as a mechanism
for protecting individual rights now inaccurately reflects the reality of how aggregative cases are
decided outside the class action rule. Id. at 524 (“To the extent it purports to draw a neat line
between class and non-class litigation, however, the traditional understanding misses important
aspects of what happens in modern, large-scale, non-class litigation. The reality of class and non-
class litigation is messier by the theoretical distinction between them.”); see also William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 432–37 (2001) (discussing
the autonomy debate as embedded in the transactional model of class action settlements).
133. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009); see also Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt,
Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual
Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877 (2009); Redish & Larsen, supra note 58,
at 1573–74, 1584–85.
134. See, e.g, Rubenstein, supra note 132, at 432–37 (stating that transaction adjudication
deepens injury to individual autonomy, violates participation rights, affronts individual dignity,
and offends the day-in-court ideal).
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ing litigant autonomy.  As discussed above, the litigant autonomy de-
bate of the 1970s and 1980s polarized along two axes: those
advocating for aggregative claims resolution through application of
the class action rule, versus traditional day-in-court proponents.135
While some scholars recently have staked out positions at similar ex-
tremes, others have sought to locate a middle ground that satisfies the
requirements of both collective redress and litigant autonomy.136
Third, many scholars engaged in this new round of debate are mindful
of the changed litigation landscape that has inspired renewed interest
in the problem of litigant autonomy in a world of aggregate
settlements.137
Contemporary scholars grappling with the litigant autonomy princi-
ple have variously attempted to offer more sophisticated and jurispru-
dentially grounded understandings of this concept.  Many scholars
recognize the individual autonomy principle as a function of due pro-
cess, an approach that is not new.138  Thus, Professor Redish has ar-
gued that the litigant autonomy principle is a logical outgrowth of the
country’s commitment to process-based liberal democratic thought,
“and therefore a foundational element of procedural due process
analysis.”139
But beyond grounding litigant autonomy in due process concerns,
Professor Redish expanded the concept to embrace a fundamental
right to participate in and resort to the processes of democratic gov-
ernment, what he calls “meta-autonomy.”140  Thus, “[a]t its defini-
tional core, democratic theory is grounded in a societal commitment
to the notions of self-determination.”141  Furthermore, the American
135. See discussion supra notes 66–99.
136. Although Professors Redish and Larsen stake out a position strongly arguing in favor of
litigant autonomy, they nonetheless recognize that even robust claims for litigant autonomy have
limits. Hence, they note, “This does not mean that litigant autonomy necessarily should be
deemed an absolute. It has long been understood that the procedural due process inquiry trig-
gers some form of weighing process that takes into account competing interests and values.”
Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1574. See also Rubenstein, supra note 132, at 432–37 (seek-
ing to define countervailing values in favor of a transactional model of aggregate claim settle-
ments that concededly sacrifice values inherent in litigant autonomy).
137. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265 (2011) (critically examining the Vioxx nonclass settlement); see also Erichson, supra
note 132; Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000); Ratner, supra note
126; Rubenstein, supra note 132 (describing the changed nature of class litigation and settlement
practices at the beginning of the twenty-first century).
138. See discussion supra note 68; see also, e.g., Campos, supra note 59, at 1060 (acknowledg-
ing Supreme Court decisions anchoring litigant autonomy principle in due process).
139. Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1574.
140. Id. at 1575.
141. Id. at 1581.
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legal system’s commitment to the adversary system is further recogni-
tion of a litigant’s autonomy in protecting or pursuing his or her rights
in the legal process.142
Moreover, Professor Redish contends that the due process version
of litigant autonomy grows out of the same constitutional grounding
as the First Amendment right of free expression,143 which itself is a
manifestation of seventeenth-century natural law theory.  Thus, by
analogizing litigant autonomy to First Amendment rights, Professor
Redish conceptualizes the principle in a manner that resonates in Pro-
fessor Trangsrud’s earlier arguments advocating the litigant autonomy
position.144
In addition to the value of democratic participation, Professor Red-
ish enumerates other essential values entailed in litigant autonomy.
These include an individual’s interest in having the power to make
choices about the protection of legally authorized or protected rights
through resort to the litigation process,145 political pluralism, self-de-
termination, and individual integrity.146   Correlatively, an individual
should not have to trust in or defer to the competence, resources, or
enthusiasm of others to protect or advance her individual interests.147
Other scholars have proposed even more opaque, detailed conceptu-
alizations of the litigant autonomy principle as a function of process-
oriented (intrinsic) or outcome-oriented (instrumental) theories of
participation.148
In the context of these efforts to formulate more sophisticated, the-
oretical definitions of litigant autonomy, scholars nonetheless have al-
igned in predictable, polarized camps in the current
collectivist–individual autonomy debate.149  Thus, Professor Redish—
although conceding that litigant autonomy is not an absolute
value150—is squarely entrenched as the most prominent advocate for
the litigant autonomy position.  Moreover, other scholars have sug-
gested that an array of federal legislation since the mid-1990s, as well
142. Id. at 1583. Professors Redish and Larsen’s conceptualization of litigant autonomy, tied
to the adversary system, resonates in the European “adversary principle,” which rigorously pro-
tects litigant autonomy, even in collective redress regimes. See discussion infra notes 166–170.
143. Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1575.
144. See supra notes 66–76 and accompanying text.
145. Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1579.
146. Id. at 1584.
147. Id. at 1583.
148. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196, 201–06 (1992).
149. See Ratner, supra note 126, at 87–92 (canvassing the current debate between those favor-
ing autonomy versus proponents of aggregation).
150. Redish & Larsen, supra note 58, at 1574.
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as a series of Supreme Court decisions, has demonstrated that the
Court “has consistently been more interested in marking the bounda-
ries of aggregation, or preserving the ideals of litigant autonomy, than
in enabling or facilitating aggregation.”151
In contrast, some contemporary aggregationists—taking a page
from the debates of the 1980s—have advanced robust defenses of
class and nonclass collective redress mechanisms, even at the expense
of the litigant autonomy principle.152  In arguing in support of the con-
temporary aggregationist position, these scholars once again debunk
the litigant autonomy ideal, rely on traditional efficiency rationales,
and contend that litigant autonomy undermines outcome fairness.153
Moreover, Professor Michael Perino has applied game theory to argue
that individual autonomy may be fundamentally incompatible with
obtaining global resolution in mass torts and other kinds of class ac-
tions, noting that strong claims for individual autonomy can destroy
class resolution of aggregate claims, while weak claims for autonomy
negate the necessity for opt-out rights.154
As a practical matter, one commentator has noted that the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is also seen as favoring aggrega-
tion.155  This panel often selects pro-aggregation judges (including
Judges Weinstein and Fallon), who have demonstrated an interest in
facilitating and managing resolution of these cases.156  Thus, notwith-
standing a litany of legislation and seemingly anti-aggregative deci-
sions emanating from the Supreme Court, in the real world of
complex litigation, efforts at collective redress (particularly under
MDL auspices) continue apace.
While the debate over aggregative litigation remains as polarized as
it was in the 1980s and 1990s, other scholars who have surveyed the
shift towards nonclass aggregate dispute resolution have endeavored
151. Ratner, supra note 126, at 88–89 (“[T]hese decisions, taken as a whole, represent a sus-
tained effort to cabin the systemic urge to aggregate.”).
152. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 148; Campos, supra note 59 (arguing that protecting litigant
autonomy in mass tort context is self-defeating, causes collective action problems, and under-
mines the deterrent effect of litigation); Sergio J. Campos, The Future of Mass Torts . . . and
How To Stop It, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 231 (2011) (arguing that the individual day-in-
court model undermines the plaintiffs’ interest by dividing potential recovery, and favoring com-
pelled mandatory class actions even though this may infringe on litigant autonomy); Richard A.
Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2010)
(seeking to break down the neat division between the perceived need for legal regulation of class
actions and “the supposedly benighted world of autonomous individual lawsuits”).
153. See articles cited supra note 152.
154. See Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of
Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 (1997).
155. Ratner, supra note 126, at 90–91.
156. Id.
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to locate an intermediate approach to reconciling the competing val-
ues of collective redress versus individual autonomy.157  Thus, Profes-
sor Erichson, contemplating the problems inherent in nonclass
aggregate litigation, has proposed that the class litigation experience is
useful in thinking about how to resolve the inherent tension between
competing collectivist and individual values.158  The class action expe-
rience, he argues, emphasizes the importance of recognizing the relin-
quishment of autonomy in the conduct of litigation and settlement
negotiations.159  Consequently, actors in the aggregate litigation arena
ought to substitute opportunities for autonomous decision making at
the two most critical moments in litigation: at the outset of collective
representation, and during the acceptance or rejection of a
settlement.160
Similarly, Professor Jay Tidmarsh has attempted to find a middle
ground convergence of autonomy with utility principles through the
application of a set of presumptions that courts should apply in assess-
ing the superiority test for class certification.161  Proceeding from the
premise that class actions should be grounded in social utility rather
than the competing value of individual litigant autonomy, Tidmarsh
nonetheless argues that a properly applied superiority analysis should
assist in supporting individual autonomy claims in appropriate
cases.162
B. The Ascendancy of Litigant Autonomy in a Collective Redress
Regime: The Example of the European Union
In the United States, the renaissance of the litigant autonomy de-
bate in the twenty-first century has taken on some urgency in the con-
text of the burgeoning recourse to nonclass, aggregate dispute
resolution techniques.  In this view, if the class actions of the mid-
157. See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV.
LITIG. 79, 105 (1994) (discussing then-pending proposed amendments to Rule 23 and suggesting
that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules should spell out principles that help clarify how
much weight litigant autonomy should receive in the class action setting) (“[L]itigant autonomy
is a potentially significant obstacle to mass-tort class actions . . . .”). Professor Rubenstein has
attempted to justify the transactional model of modern aggregate claim resolution, particularly
in the class action context, by asserting that certain off-setting principles such as equality and
efficiency justify the sacrifice of individual autonomy claims. Rubenstein, supra note 132, at
432–37. The efficiency rationale historically is the oldest justification undergirding aggregate set-
tlements; Rubenstein simply applies this and similar rationales to contemporary settlement
classes.
158. Erichson, supra note 132, at 529.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (2013).
162. Id.
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1980s and 1990s willingly sacrificed litigant autonomy on the altar of
utilitarian efficiency, then nonclass aggregate settlements of the
twenty-first century are even more problematic in ignoring or overrid-
ing litigant autonomy claims.  Thus, collective redress mechanisms
that are largely untethered from the judicial oversight provided by the
class action rule present an even ruder affront to the litigant auton-
omy principle.163
Surveying the changed litigation landscape with its shift towards
nonclass aggregate settlements, some academic commentators (as
noted above) have sought to explore solutions that address the inher-
ent paradox that the individual autonomy principle often undermines
or defeats collective redress.  However admirable these attempts to
find a middle ground, as a practical matter, these proposals seem tepid
or impractical surrogates for the protection of robust litigant
autonomy.
Hence, the suggestion that courts pay special attention to ensuring
litigant participation at the outset of litigation as well as during settle-
ment negotiations—in absence the of concrete suggestions concerning
how to accomplish these goals—remains laudatory and idealistic rhet-
oric unlikely to be implemented.  Moreover, the suggestion that courts
adopt an enhanced superiority analysis to protect litigant autonomy in
compelling cases, while interesting, is unlikely to affect current class
action jurisprudence or a judge’s cursory application of the superiority
requirement or gain traction in the real world.  Also, this proposal has
no application apart from the class action context and therefore is not
especially helpful in addressing the litigant autonomy issue in nonclass
aggregative settings.
In the context of this American academic debate over what is to be
done, the EU countries have developed an interesting approach to
resolving the problem presented by the competing values inherent in
collective redress regimes pitted against the litigant autonomy princi-
ple.  As is perhaps now well-known, the EU countries throughout the
twentieth century steadfastly resisted enactment of any American-
style class action litigation mechanisms.164  The well-documented Eu-
ropean resistance to class action litigation was based on a variety of
jurisprudential, historical, and sociological factors.165  Moreover, the
163. See Mullenix, supra note 130.
164. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217 (1992) (discussing the European resistance
to American class action litigation and reasons for the unlikely prospects for enacting class ac-
tion regimes in European countries).
165. Id. There are numerous reasons why it may be difficult to transplant American-style class
action litigation onto European continental legal systems, including but not limited to (1) a lack
632 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:601
civil law countries’ emphatic adherence to a central “adversary” prin-
ciple of justice impeded efforts towards enactment of collective re-
dress regimes.166  In essence, the European adversary principle,
derived from natural law, expresses a fundamental day-in-court right
that is conceived of as intrinsic to human nature and an individual’s
very personhood.
In the twenty-first century, however, the traditional European resis-
tance to class litigation has significantly changed, with almost all EU
countries now embracing some form of collective redress mecha-
nisms.167  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the
array of aggregative approaches EU countries have adopted, it is sig-
nificant to note that all—with three exceptions168—have sought to
preserve the adversary principle within collective redress rules.169  The
EU countries, then, have maintained the autonomy principle by con-
ditioning collective redress on the opt-in principle: that is, persons
must individually affirm and consent to joining any collective
action.170
This is in stark contrast to the American approach to class litigation,
which affords no right of consent to participate in mandatory class
of entrepreneurial lawyering; (2) different attorney fee regimes; (3) a lack of contingency fees;
(4) a lack of punitive damages; (5) strong regulatory oversight; (6) strong social and medical
support systems; (7) different judicial roles; (8) a lack of jury trials; and (9) different legal and
social cultures eschewing litigation and blame. See Linda S. Mullenix, American Exceptionalism
and Convergence Theory: Are We There Yet? in COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
CATEGORIES 41 (Janet Walker & Oscar Chase eds., 2010) (Proceedings of the International As-
sociation of Procedural Law, Toronto Conference on “The Future of Categories”), reprinted at
49 SUPREME CT. L. REV. 2D 41 (2010); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Com-
plexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4–12 (2001).
166. See, e.g., Alessandro Barzaghi, Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments
in Italy, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61, 79, 81 (2005) (discussing the Italian adversary principle).
167. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2009, at 7 (discussing European, common law, and
other civil law countries that have adopted a class action or aggregate dispute resolution mecha-
nism); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the same); Janet Walker, Who’s
Afraid of U.S.-Style Class Actions?, 18 SW. J. INT’L. L. 509 (2012) (discussing the same).
168. See Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member
States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 415–27 (2009).  The three
countries adopting opt-out regimes are Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Id. at 415.  All
other European countries that have adopted some form of collective redress mechanism have
done so on an opt-in basis. Id. at 415–20.
169. Id. (providing a detailed discussion of EU countries’ collective redress mechanisms, and
describing a preference for the opt-in principle in most of these law reforms).
170. Id.; see also Andrea Conzatti, The Recognition of U.S. “Opt-Out” Class Actions in China,
44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 641 (2013) (suggesting that China most likely would not recognize American
opt-out class action judgments because of its adherence to the civil law adversary principle).
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action litigation,171 and no opportunity to opt-out.  Thus, class mem-
bers in mandatory class actions can neither expressly nor impliedly
consent to the adjudication of their rights.  The American class action
rule provides an opt-out right only to claimants involved in a Rule
23(b)(3) damage class action.172  Furthermore, the American opt-out
right is available only at the back-end of class action proceedings, af-
ter a court has certified a litigation class or provisionally approved a
negotiated settlement.  In other words, the American opt-out princi-
ple affords scant opportunities for meaningful individual participation
in aggregate litigation.  Moreover, unlike the EU countries, the
United States has steadfastly repudiated all efforts to introduce an
opt-in principle to its class action rule173 or embrace the opt-in class in
its jurisprudence.174
While individual EU countries have forged ahead with enacting an
array of different aggregate dispute resolution mechanisms to apply
domestically, the supervening EU legislative body—the EU Commis-
sion—finally propounded an EU Commission Recommendation on
collective redress for all EU member states in August 2013.175  After
several years of exhaustive study and debate, the EU Recommenda-
tion sets forth principles for a collective redress mechanism.176  Signif-
icantly for the debate over litigant autonomy, the EU
Recommendation authorizes creation of a collective redress mecha-
nism conditioned on an opt-in right.177  In mandating this opt-in re-
quirement, the EU Parliament eschewed the alternative opt-out
mechanism that undergirds the American class action rule, as well as
the opt-out principle incorporated by three member states in their in-
dividual collective redress legislation.178  In this fashion, the EU rec-
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2). These are the so-called mandatory
classes. Claimants who are part of these classes have no right to opt-out of the class, and under
American class action jurisprudence, there is no mechanism for opting into the class.
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (class action for damages; class claimants must receive notice of
the action and the right to opt-out of the class).
173. See Bone, supra note 157, at 84–85 (commenting on a pending proposal to amend Rule
23(c) to authorize an opt-in class, to be used only rarely); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)
(Proposed Rule 1993), FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee note (Proposed Draft 1993);
Christopher J. Roche, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for Adjudi-
cation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1472–75 (2005) (describing the attempted 1991 reform to Rule 23,
which included an opt-in provision to replace the opt-out provisions, but was withdrawn and not
submitted to the Advisory Committee).
174. See Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
175. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60.
176. Id.; see also Resolution on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Re-
dress, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2012)0021 (2012).
177. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60.
178. Id.
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ognized the fundamental European adherence to the adversary
principle, which the EU Commission was unwilling to sacrifice in the
interests of achieving collective redress.
C. Reflections on the Comparative U.S. Preference for an Opt-Out
Procedure
The American preference for an opt-out class procedure, limited to
Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions, is a longstanding bedrock princi-
ple of our class action practice.179  In successive decades, proponents
of the opt-out procedure have successfully defeated attempts to
amend Rule 23 to require an opt-in rather than an opt-out princi-
ple.180  Nonetheless, this steadfast adherence to the opt-out principle
has been justified more by a peculiar American-style pragmatism than
by any well-reasoned jurisprudence.181
Thus, the arguments marshalled in favor of the opt-out principle
tend to run to practical considerations rather than any overarching,
philosophical theories of justice—although the practical arguments ul-
timately are impressed into the service of this loftier arc.  Supporters
of the opt-out principle generally contend that people are busy, inat-
tentive, lacking in sophistication, or at worst, lazy.  In this narrative,
only the most energized and attentive claimants will make an effort to
join litigation.  Hence, any procedure that requires a person to take
affirmative steps to join litigation is bound to fail, thereby denying
people the right to remediation through their sheer personal inertia.
Proponents of the opt-out principle contend that this argument has
even greater force in small-claims class litigation, where people have
even less incentive to take affirmative steps to join class litigation con-
cerning trivial claims that they may not even care about.
Supporters of the opt-out principle point to studies showing the low
rates of opt-out claims in Rule 23(b)(3) actions as proof that people
are disinclined to make an affirmative effort to execute steps in their
own interests.182  In this view, then, the opt-out principle accomplishes
179. The opt-out procedure has been part of Rule 23 since the 1966 Amendments introduced
the (b)(3) damage class action category into the revised rule. See Mulheron, supra note 168, at
427–53 (discussing arguments for and against opt-in and opt-out classes, based on the British
experience with the opt-in procedure; arguing in favor of EU countries adopting an opt-out rule
instead).
180. See supra note 173 (discussing attempts at inducing the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to amend Rule 23 to adopt an opt-in regime rather than the current opt-out regime).
181. See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
182. See Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting Parallel State
Wage Claims To Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 515,
544–45 (2009) (noting low participation rates in both opt-in and opt-out actions); see also Chris-
topher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settle-
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justice by embracing (and binding) the broadest class of claimants
who need to do nothing to receive remediation for a violation of rights
or other injury.  On the contrary, the opt-in principle undermines jus-
tice and fairness goals by requiring a person to take affirmative steps
to engage in the litigation process, which few will actually exercise.
Moreover, both the plaintiff and defense bars continue to support
the American opt-out regime for entirely rational, self-interested rea-
sons, although both sides of the docket are perfectly capable of bend-
ing self-serving arguments into more principled rhetoric sounding in
fairness themes.  On the plaintiffs’ side of the docket, class attorneys
seek to maximize the size of any class because of the negotiating lev-
erage conferred by the threat of a large class of claimants.  Perhaps
even more important, the maintenance of a sizeable class of claimants
will redound to larger counsel fees accruing through class-wide settle-
ment.  To the extent that a front-end opt-in principle might diminish
class participation, jeopardize threshold class certification because of a
lack of numerosity, undermine negotiation strategy, and imperil large
fees, plaintiffs’ class action attorneys have little incentive to endorse
an opt-in rule.
On the defense side of the class action docket, corporate defendants
also support the opt-out principle for entirely different reasons.  The
opt-out principle assists defendants in securing global peace of all
claims, and in this regard, class action defendants actually benefit
from the “lazy claimant” stereotype. Precisely because studies demon-
strate that few claimants opt-out after receiving notice, defendants are
able to bind to a judgment a maximum universe of potential plaintiffs
who might otherwise pursue individual claims.  This goal of binding
the greatest number of class members is the reason why corporate
defendants typically insist on so-called “exploding provisions” in class
action settlements: that is, that a settlement will explode or be re-
scinded if the number of opt-out claimants exceeds a certain percent-
age of the class size.183
ments, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 121 (2007) (discussing low opt-out rates); Francis E. McGovern,
Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 53, 54 (2008) (noting the extremely low participation rate in claims-made class
action settlement); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10 (1996) (finding the median opt-out rate in four case studies to be
“either 0.1% or 0.2%”).
183. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 925 (1987) (noting that a large
number of opt-outs might induce defendants to withdraw from settlements); see also Richard A.
Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
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Theoretically, it might seem that defendants ought to endorse an
opt-in principle if it is true that few will make that effort, thereby un-
dermining the potential for class certification, enhancing defendants’
bargaining position, and reducing exposure to class-wide damages and
attorney fees.  However, this is a counterintuitive conclusion because
corporate defendants in complex mass actions generally prefer to ne-
gotiate sweeping aggregate settlements that bind all potential claim-
ants (whether lazy or not), on terms of the defendants’ own devising,
to the alternative of death by a thousand cuts.
The opt-out preference in American class litigation, then, has be-
come firmly entrenched through nearly fifty years of experience that
has educated the practicing bar to the strategic and pragmatic advan-
tages of this regime.  The attorneys who work these cases have little
incentive to reform a system based on a principled litigant autonomy
argument.  In this, attorneys are supported by a judiciary that reflex-
ively rejects and dismisses the opt-in option as un-American and not
supported by any authority.
Thus, the Second Circuit swiftly and curtly repudiated the single ex-
perimental attempt to apply an opt-in procedure in an American class
action.184  In presiding over the Austrian ski fire class litigation, which
claimed the lives of 155 victims, including eight Americans, Judge
Shira Scheindlin conditionally certified a liability-only class predicated
on the requirement that foreign claimants affirmatively opt-in to the
class.185  She justified her order of an opt-in class based on her equity
powers as a judge;186 she most likely was concerned that any Ameri-
can class judgment would not be recognized or accorded res judicata
effects in the foreign claimants’ home countries unless the foreign
claimants were afforded an opt-in right.187  In response, the Second
Circuit indicated that equity did not provide a basis for a judge order-
149, 173 (2003) (commenting that en masse opt-out of high value claims may scuttle opt-out class
settlement).
184. Kern, 393 F.3d at 124.
185. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 220 F.R.D. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev’d sub nom. Kern, 393 F.3d 120.
186. Id. at 210 (noting that the class action rule itself had equity origins). Judge Scheindlin
also based her authority to order an opt-in class on an analogous opt-in procedure under FSLA
actions, and citation to two cases suggesting this was permissible. See id. at 209–11.
187. Id. at 209 (discussing the problem of binding foreign claimants to an American class
action judgment in an opt-out class action, and problem of possible lack of preclusion by foreign
courts);  see aslo Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The
Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893 (2012) (discussing the problem of res judicata
effects of American class action judgments by foreign nation states); Tanya J. Monestier, Trans-
national Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discuss-
ing the same); Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class
Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2011) (discussing the same); Rhonda Wasserman, Transna-
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ing an opt-in class, noting that there was absolutely no authority in
Rule 23 or American class action jurisprudence to support certifica-
tion of an opt-in class.188
The debate surrounding the American opt-out preference is ad-
vanced solely with reference to class action litigation, but has little
valence for nonclass litigation that is not subject to the class action
rule.  Even if the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were somehow
persuaded to endorse an opt-in procedure for Rule 23, this would
have no authoritative impact—other than as a persuasive model—on
nonclass aggregative techniques currently deployed to resolve mass
disputes.  In this regard, the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion,189 setting forth broad principles to govern disputes not subject to
the class action rule, endorsed an opt-in principle for such litigation.
In so doing, they cited and relied on Judge Scheindlin’s decision in the
Austrian ski fire litigation.190
V. CONCLUSION
As indicated above, the debate over litigant autonomy versus col-
lective redress has taken on a new life in the twenty-first century, par-
ticularly as the litigation landscape has been transformed by the
emergence of large-scale nonclass aggregative disputes.  Generally,
advocates on both sides of the debate fail to acknowledge—let alone
give credence to—the legitimate competing values on either side, but
instead have retreated into well-worn, polarized camps that largely
resonate in the same debate that played out in the 1980s and 1990s.
What has changed, however, is the enhanced sophistication of the aca-
demic theories brought to bear in the debate.
Nonetheless, scholars, jurists, and practicing lawyers have generally
dug in on one side or the other, and rigidly maintain that justice and
fairness is achievable only through their particular vision of either in-
dividual or aggregate dispute resolution.  Meanwhile, the commenta-
tors who have attempted to find some middle path that acknowledges
and accounts for the competing values of litigant autonomy and col-
lective redress have only been able to offer somewhat unrealistic, ide-
alistic proposals that are unlikely to gain traction in the real world.
tional Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2011) (dis-
cussing the same).
188. Kern, 393 F.3d at 128. The Court rejected all three bases upon which Judge Scheindlin
issued her order. Id. at 125–29.
189. A.L.I., supra note 129, § 2.10, at 176–77 (“Aggregation by Consent”) (rejecting the Sec-
ond Circuit’s holding in Kern prohibiting an opt-in class as incorrect).
190. Id. at 177 cmt. a.
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The current challenge, then, is to rethink the problem of how to
preserve litigant autonomy in the age of collective redress. It seems
clear that the solution will not be found in the Advisory Committee’s
tinkering at the edges of the existing class action rule, or by urging
judges to do something different or better in their oversight of either
class or nonclass litigation.  Moreover, half-baked efforts at providing
litigants with some enhanced opportunities for participation may run
the risk of devolving into little more than forms of autonomy window-
dressing, without meaningfully addressing the fundamental human
dignity and participation concerns that underlie the autonomy
principle.
The EU Principles for Collective Redress,191 mandating an individ-
ual’s opt-in election as a condition for participation in an aggregate
resolution of mass claims, supplies fertile ground for reconsidering the
American resistance to the opt-in alternative.  The opt-in principle,
long advocated by Professor Redish as the basic construct underlying
democratic participation in class litigation, merits more thoughtful
consideration than the cursory dismissal typically accorded in Ameri-
can deliberations.192  Moreover, the EU countries have agreed upon
the necessity for the opt-in principle as it applies to collective redress
mechanisms—entirely apart from the American class action context.
In an interesting example of procedural convergence, perhaps reflect-
ing on the EU’s preference for opt-in regimes, the Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation also similarly has endorsed the opt-in
principle.193
It should be noted that the requirement of an opt-in regime is only a
first step towards accomplishing a measure of litigant autonomy
within collective redress settings.  But requiring individuals to opt-in is
an important threshold recognition that affirmative consent is a more
robust expression of litigant autonomy than its alternative of implied
consent through failure to opt-out.  American jurisprudence, then, has
it backwards: in the class action arena, only after significant litigation
events have occurred, up to and including class certification and settle-
ment negotiations, are individual litigants afforded a right to exit the
class.  In the absence of electing this option, class action jurisprudence
191. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60.
192. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
903, 911 & n.54 (citing authority); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1446–47 (2003) (arguing for class settlements to bind only those
claimants who opt in).
193. A.L.I., supra note 129, § 2.10, at 176–77 (discussing the possibility of aggregation by ac-
tual consent of claimants in exceptional situations).
2015] COMPETING VALUES 639
determines that individuals have impliedly consented to an aggregate
resolution of individual claims.194
Additionally, there is simply no right of consent in mandatory class
actions, based on the theoretical notion of class cohesion and homoge-
neity.  And, as twenty-first century complex litigation has demon-
strated, the questions of express or implied consent to aggregate
resolution of individual claims is even further exacerbated in the non-
class context.  In the absence of a Rule 23 amendment to include a
litigant opt-in requirement—which is highly unlikely, given the results
of historical attempts—there are few other institutional or procedural
mechanisms to accomplish even this limited form of litigant
autonomy.
In reconceptualizing the problem of litigant autonomy in the age of
collective redress, it is important to begin from a position that recog-
nizes this is not a zero-sum problem: that according individual auton-
omy does not necessarily defeat aggregative dispute resolution
techniques.  Much of the debate, spanning decades, has posited that
the principle of litigant autonomy is in intractable and unresolvable
tension with aggregative settlement, and one must give way for the
other.  However, providing meaningful measures of litigant autonomy
need not be the enemy of efficient and fair resolution of mass claims.
The opt-in principle is a useful starting point to secure a degree of
litigant autonomy, but even this must be accomplished with knowing,
informed, and intelligent decision making.195  The opt-in principle
ought to be mandated at the very outset of proposed aggregate litiga-
tion and not deferred until some later time when individual participa-
tion opportunities have been significantly diminished or eliminated.
Moreover, preserving litigant autonomy under collective redress re-
gimes should not end with an opt-in right, but should incorporate
practical and meaningful opportunities for litigant participation
through collective proceedings.
194. See Leslie, supra note 182, at 120–23 (stating that courts approving settlements misinter-
pret failure to opt-out as approval of settlement terms).
195. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the Election of Remedies: The Need
for Informed Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833 (2012) (discussing the need for informed consent
mechanisms to protect the rights of prospective litigants forced to elect between individual litiga-
tion or a relief fund award forfeiting a litigation right).
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